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Australia as a middle power:
Fighting or fanning the 
flames of Asia?
>> Every year, Australians face the peril of bushfires. For thosewhose houses might be at risk, there is always a difficult choice:
Do you volunteer and work with relevant institutions to collectively
help pre-empt any outbreaks in your area? Do you find like-minded
friends and partners and fight to protect your own house and
community? Or do you take your family away to safety and hope for
the best? 
Asia’s strategic system has not yet produced flames, but there is plenty
of smoke and similar dilemmas for policymakers. Australia’s
conservative ‘Coalition’ government firmly believes that the best
approach is to work with likeminded partners such as the United States
(US) and Japan. Indeed the former Prime Minister Tony Abbott
(2013-2015), himself a volunteer firefighter, undertook this task with a
sense of urgency, in the growing belief a fire has already been lit. 
The opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP), currently led by Bill
Shorten is much less confident in its approach. By nature the party
prefers collective, preventative responses. The ALP has a long record
supporting existing institutions and promoting new ones. For example,
an unsuccessful 2008 bid for an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ to address
precisely these issues. Yet the party also recognises this may not be
enough. Lacking clear ideas for how to revive global multilateralism, it
has also worked to deepen the Australia-US alliance. 
• Australia’s main concern is
preservation of the globalised
international order. 
• The most popular option for
achieving this is cooperation
with likeminded major powers,
though hope remains for
multilateral breakthroughs.
• However, Australia is unsure of
the right course in Asia, and
therefore more likely to remain
reactive and supportive of
others’ initiatives than re-adopt
its former role as a ‘norm
entrepreneur’. 
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While no major public leader has called for
Australia to abandon the increasing heat in Asia for
the cooler climate of the South Pacific, these
sentiments can be found in the public. Many
Australians are very sceptical about sending military
forces beyond Australian shores, and would prefer
to concentrate on domestic issues rather than
foreign entanglements. How Australia chooses
between these options will do much to shape its
actions as a ‘middle power’1, and in the long term
may even determine whether it remains one.
AUSTRALIA’S WORLD VIEW
Australia exists because of the creation of a
globalised, western-led order. Founded by the
British in 1770, the country has always seen its
security as intimately tied to international order
and stability. It was for this reason Australia sent
vast numbers of its young men to fight in Europe
and the Middle East in both 20th century World
Wars. Australia was also eager to be involved in
the resulting League of Nations and United
Nations (UN). The Cold War offered the first
sustained threat to Australian interests, yet was
largely viewed by its government and people in
terms of a potential change to global order and
the clash of norms and values. 
Australian thinking about today’s changing
international environment is once more primarily
based around values and norms, rather than
defending specific national interests. Following
British maritime strategist Geoffrey Till, Australia
is best seen as a ‘post-modern’ nation, concerned
with protecting a globalised, interconnected
society.2 Such ideas come naturally to the new
Prime Minister, Malcom Turnbull, who took
office in September 2015. Turnbull is a former
investment banker, who stresses the economic
opportunities alongside the dislocation and risks
of Asia’s transition. Persuading the public to this
view, and explaining Australia’s role will however
require new rhetoric. The familiar label ‘middle
power’ has over 70 years of use in Australian
politics, but is seen by many as carrying too much
historic baggage to be of use.
The country merges a sense of short term pride in
Australia’s move up the global economic ranks —
12th overall in nominal Gross Domestic Product
terms — along with a fear of relative decline in
the long term. In a world where population is
overtaking productivity as the main determinant
of national wealth, Australia’s 23 million people
mean a future of declining significance compared
to South Korea (50 million), Vietnam (91
million), and Indonesia (249 million) — let alone
India (1.29 billion) and China (1.37 billion).
This shifting distribution of power, particularly
in terms of conferring legitimacy, will make it
harder for Australia to remain a middle power in
normative and institutional terms, even if it
materially remains prosperous and secure. As
such, its primary security goal is the preservation
of the existing global order, rather than a concern
that Australia itself may be attacked or have its
interests forcibly threatened. 
In the nation’s capital, two widely discussed
threats are Islamic State and Russia. Both may
harm individual Australians, but almost certainly
never Australian territory. Rather, it is the
challenge these actors present to the Westphalian
and Western-led order that draws Canberra’s
attention. China occupies an even greater role in
Australian thinking about global order, yet it too
is unlikely to directly threaten core Australian
interests, let alone the Australian continent. As
such, the debate around modern security issues is
largely framed in terms of the stability of the
international order, the degree to which its key
norms and values remain, the scope for smaller
nations to be heard, and how disputes and
differences are likely to be resolved in the future.
Only in the South Pacific are Australian concerns
less abstract and tied to specific interests. This is 
a region for which Australia bears some
responsibility, and where a range of secondary
order problems loom. Climate change, for
instance, is likely to lead to greater demand for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At its
worse, it may also provoke political and social
instability in some nations, or lead to mass
migration.3 Setbacks to the rule of law and a lack
of capacity in the small island states of the region
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may also encourage criminal activity such as drug
smuggling. These issues matter and at times draw
significant Australian interest. But, save a
cataclysmic change, will receive less attention and
resources than the strategic issues of Asia or global
instability. For all the ongoing debate, Australian
foreign and defence policy settings have remained
relatively stable. 
AUSTRALIA AS A MIDDLE POWER –
COOPERATING WITH LIKE-MINDED
PARTNERS
The Australian government’s firm belief is that the
best response to international and regional instabil-
ity is to cooperate with larger states of similar atti-
tudes. This is not collective action in the sense 
of institutional multilateralism. Rather it is 
more of an informal
coalition, bringing
together those with
similar interests and
most importantly
similar values. To
this end, the current
government has
strongly re-enforced
its ties with the US.
It has built on a 2011
agreement, signed
under the previous
Labor government, to base US Marines in Darwin
in the country’s north. Negotiations are underway
to base US bombers such as the B-2 and B-52s in
Australia as well. 
There has also been a strengthening of ties with
Japan, as a fellow democracy over previous years.
Speculation was rife in 2014 that Japan had
agreed to sell 12 diesel submarines to Australia,
the largest military transfer in either country’s
history. Any such deal may be derailed by
domestic pressure over local industry and jobs,
but there is a chance it could still come to
fruition. Australia, Japan and the US also work
together through the Trilateral Security
Dialogue, which enables regular meetings of
cabinet level officials from Tokyo, Washington
and Canberra. Many in this triangle would like to
bring in India to create a powerful democratic
and capitalist quadrilateral. To support these
ambitions the government has recently increased
defence spending from 1.56% to 1.93% of GDP.
Both parties are now committed to a 2% target as
a benchmark.
Though keen to stay close to the US, the
Australian position should not be described as a
‘deputy sheriff’. Australia has differed from the
US on several issues. It is unwilling to be seen as
a launching pad for US flights against China’s
interests in the South China Sea. Canberra also
signed up to China’s Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) against Washington’s
wishes, and has urged a larger role for Beijing in
existing forums such as the International
Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank.
Finally, while American thinking over the last 18
months has been increasingly framed in terms of
regional competition with China, Australian
officials resist notions of an inevitable clash.
This is not to presume Australia will have to
choose between the US and China. As Nick
Bisley of La Trobe University perceptively notes,
Australia is not a ‘conflicted ally’. Along with its
comfort in the western, US-led global order,
‘Australia’s experiences of China’s increasingly
confident and assertive policy in 2009 and 2010
… catalysed policy thinking’.4 The differences
between Canberra and Washington are due to
slightly different national interests that shape how
they interpret and rank the key aspects of the
global order. Washington remains unable to
separate its leadership role from the order it
helped create. Canberra meanwhile would accept
greater equality between the major powers if this
meant the order remained stable. Where
Washington is inclined to view each moment as
potentially defining and talks of grand bargains,
Canberra prefers a more pragmatic, ground up
approach. As the head of Australia’s diplomatic
corps, Peter Varghese, has put it ‘The process of
adjusting to shifting power balances in a
multipolar Asia will be incremental and organic’.5 >>>>>>
Australia, once
condemned to the
‘Tyranny of
Distance’, now finds
itself faced with the
‘Peril of Proximity'
Australia accepts rather than encourages the
expected multipolar order, and has largely
welcomed the rise of other powers in Asia. Most
notably, it has publicly supported India’s desire for
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and
made peace with New Delhi’s nuclear acquisition,
agreeing to sell it uranium in 2013. Such is the pull
of India, that Australian strategic policy has been
reframed as operating within the ‘Indo-Pacific’ —
a region spanning one-third of the world’s surface,
covering South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast
Asia and the United States.6
Australia’s political class has also reconciled itself
with a rising Indonesia. Relations have been par-
ticularly weak and fractious in recent years due to
a rolling series of crises over issues such as the live
cattle trade, asylum seekers, Australian drug
smugglers and allegations of high level spying on
the former Indonesian President and his wife.
While distrust and uncertainty remain, Australian
defence policy is no longer designed around
countering threats from Indonesia, as it had been
from the 1960s until well into the 21st century.
Today however, Australian officials increasingly
look to Indonesia as a long term partner and fire-
wall against traditional and non-traditional secu-
rity problems. Indonesia might not be willing to
reciprocate, presently seeing little value in its
smaller southern neighbour. Still, the shift is sub-
stantial and any combined efforts from these two
middle powers would be significant for the
regional order. 
AUSTRALIA’S MULTILATERAL OPTIONS
In a bid to pre-empt a clash with emerging
powers, or an order transition away from the
western-friendly status quo, the Australian
government has actively participated in
multilateralism to shape and mould the order.
This effort has been more understated in recent
years than it was in the early 1990s, in part
because of a lack of major new ideas or radical re-
thinking. This cautious but engaged style also
suits the current Australian government and to a
degree the regional mood. The former Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd had set out to restore
Australia’s activist middle power role, but only
succeeded in earning a reputation for too much
talking and too little listening. Southeast Asia in
the early 1990s was also open ground for new
forums and bodies to be tried, while today there
is a sense of institutional fatigue. There are more
meetings than most of the big countries can
possibly send senior representatives to, and
scholars talk of a ‘noodle bowl’ of acronyms and
associations that intertwine, overlap and entangle.
Institutionally, the East Asia Summit (EAS) is
now the most important multilateral structure for
Australia. This represents a change since 2007,
away from the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) which has struggled to
move beyond economics. The EAS has the right
membership, involving all the major countries of
the region, and a clear mandate for addressing
regional security and economic concerns. Yet like
other institutions its promise has gone unfulfilled
in recent years. Some Australians still hold faith
in the UN — as evidenced by the bid for a
rotating seat on the Security Council for 2013-
2014. But few expect the world body to solve the
particular challenges facing Australia’s region, or
be the forum for a new global bargain on world
order. Australia has regularly encouraged UN
reform as a serious project. Yet it has found the
path regularly thwarted, and lacks both the
authority and necessity to demand change. 
The G20 is also invested with promise, especially
after Australia was the host nation in 2014. The
Brisbane summit committed members to raising
GDP growth for members by 2%, and a range of
other investment, trade and productivity
ambitions.7 Notably one of Australia’s favourite
new multilateral structures, MIKTA (Mexico,
Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia) is itself
a by-product of the G20s division. With the G7
and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South
Africa) often operating as sub groups within 
the body, the left over middle powers had to 
fend for themselves. Yet like a firetruck driven by
committee, just agreeing on the proper
destination is proving difficult.
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The rise of MIKTA shows Australia’s willingness to
look for new partners. Of course, every politician,
scholar and briefing document over the last decade
has talked about wanting new and more
cooperation. Limits are easily reached, and some
common purpose is required for meaningful
consultation and cooperation to occur. Australian
engagement with the European Union (EU) will
therefore likely occur on an ad hoc basis. Canberra
is a member of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
and Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). These
forums were important openings for responding to
the murder of 28 Australians aboard MH17, shot
down over Ukraine. Canberra may also be willing
to support European initiated policies on refugees,
counter-terrorism, internet governance, or, in the
right circumstances, climate change. In the vast
majority of cases, this will require European
initiative to start cooperation. It is not that
Australia is unwilling to lead or cooperate with
other middle powers. But when it wants to do so,
it will, to use the words of the former Prime
Minister, lean towards ‘more Jakarta, less Geneva’.8
Canberra continues to assume that the challenge
of emerging powers to global order will be evolu-
tionary rather than revolutionary. It regularly
reassures itself that given the prosperity and ben-
efits these countries have earned, they will not
risk it all. As such, the hope is that by showing a
willingness to defend the order, along with mak-
ing small adjustments to the structure, these
countries will moderate their behaviour and
become fully incorporated members. On the
security and economic front, Australia is unlikely
to return to its norm entrepreneurial past when it
championed issues such as non-proliferation and
trade liberalisation.9 Uncertain times seem to be
cowering rather than compelling Australia’s mid-
dle power identity, making it more ad hoc and
focused on the short term than previously. 
FUTURE PROSPECTS – FIGHTING OR
FANNING THE FLAMES?
Australia’s real choice is not between the US and
China, but between continuing to protect a
normative-based global order, or abandoning it
for a power-based order. The former is the status
quo option, to continue investing in the
experiment of multilateralism, laws and norms as
a way to manage conflict and clashing interests.
In other words, to continue working collectively
and hope that will pre-empt any threat from
breaking out. 
The latter path is to decide that the benefits of the
current order cannot be separated from the US
(especially US military dominance). This would
mean deciding that preserving American primacy
is the only real path to safety, and if that requires
declaring the rules-based international order
unworkable, then so be it. This would be the like-
minded coalition option, working with a select,
trusted few to fan the flames in the hope it burns
bright but quickly. It is a more comfortable path
today, given the trustworthiness of old friends
over institutions. But it is also potentially more
dangerous in the future, requiring Australia to
support those same friends should they find
themselves in a conflict. Some states in Asia also
worry that building new security links will 
not deter China but re-enforce its fears of
containment, thus fanning the flames for a
potentially devastating conflict.
A crucial factor in Australia’s future as a middle
power will be the role of domestic public opinion.
The public has tended to go along with support
for the global order, but far less enthusiastically
than the policy elites. There are undercurrents of
xenophobia and protectionism which also
threaten to undermine national deals. During
2014-15, economic deals with China and security
arrangements with Japan faced significant public
opposition. Supporting the US and the UN
remain overwhelmingly popular, though the
former more than the latter. While not displaying
the same rising nationalism as other parts of the
globe, Australian political leaders ignore public
opinion at their peril. When Tony Abbott was in
opposition he masterfully tapped a torrent of
public anger. But as Prime Minister he found
himself the target and was washed away by it.
After less than two years as leader he was replaced,
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marking the fourth change of Prime Minister in
the last five years. If the public decide to abandon
Asia’s great game for the presumed safety of
isolation, it will require a rare and brave leader to
stop them. 
As Australia’s new Prime Minister, Malcolm
Turnbull likes to quote, The Economist magazine
once described Australia as ‘one of the best
managers of adversity the world has seen and the
worst managers of prosperity’.10 Let us hope this
is true. This middle power, once condemned to
the ‘Tyranny of Distance’ now finds itself facing
the ‘Peril of Proximity’. It is on the front lines of
the 21st century’s most important geopolitical
struggle and will need all the guile and creative
diplomacy it can muster to help blow away the
smoke, tamper down any flames and keep the
globe safe and cool.
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